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Then “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule recently received explicit impetus from
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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The "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule recently received
explicit impetus from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Meeting en
banc,' a thirteen judge majority held in United States v. Williams2 that
evidence discovered by police officers acting in the reasonable good
faith that their action was authorized, should not be suppressed merely
because this reliance later proved to be unjustified. In coming to this
conclusion, the court looked to the purpose of the rule, its success at
achieving that purpose, and its effect on the field of criminal justice.
Based on these factors, and acknowledging the current contraction of
the exclusionary rule, the Fifth Circuit became the first federal appel-
late court to recognize such an exception.
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The origin of what has become known as the "exclusionary rule"
is rooted in the fourth amendment.3 However, the modern effect of the
rule was first promulgated 110 years after the ratification of the
amendment. Until that time, the area had been a largely "unexplored
territory.' 5 Then, in 1914, the Supreme Court held that evidence
1. The case was reheard en bane on the court's own motion. The panel decision is
reported as United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 98 (5th Cir. 1979).
2. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
4. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), adopted the exclusionary rule
while disallowing evidence which the defendant was compelled to produce in violation
of the fifth amendment. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 49-61 (1966).
5. LANDYNSKI, supra note 4, at 49.
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wrongfully seized by federal officials was not to be admitted in criminal
or civil trials.' In keeping with the view that the fourth amendment was
not applicable against the states, this decision was only binding on fed-
eral officials. This concept was affirmed in 19497 subject to subsequent
limitations." The exclusionary rule was enforced in state courts and
against state officials in 1961 when the Court, through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, handed down the landmark deci-
sion of Mapp v. Ohio.9
THE PURPOSE OF THE RULE
Three underlying purposes have emerged as a logical rationale for
the exclusionary rule. The initial purpose was to protect the privacy of
individuals against illegal searches and seizures. However:
[T]he Supreme Court later downgraded the protection of privacy ratio-
nale, perhaps because of the obvious defect that the rule purports to do
nothing to recompense innocent victims of Fourth Amendment viola-
tions, and the gnawing doubt as to just what right of privacy guilty indi-
viduals have in illegal firearms, contraband narcotics and policy betting
slips - the frequent objects of search and seizure. 10
As this rationale fell in disfavor, proponents of the rule turned to a
different analysis. In time, a second reasoning developed. It was be-
lieved that using illegally obtained evidence brought the court system
into disrepute and allowed the judicial system to become tainted by
working in partnership with lawbreakers (police who obtain evidence
illegally)."" This thought was succinctly stated by Justice Brandeis
6. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
7. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
8. In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Supreme Court excluded
evidence that was obtained in a manner which shocked the conscience. But see Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OB-
TAINED EVIDENCE 47-50 (1977), cited in Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Sup-
press Evidence, 62 JUDICATURE 214, 220 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
11. This rationale was summarily treated by Justice Brennan in his dissent in
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357-58 (1971).
1 132 Nova Law Journal 5:1980 1
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when he wrote that "government officials shall be subjected to the same
rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. . . . If the govern-
ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. '1 2
The modern rationale for this rule, however, is to deter the police
officer from violating the fourth amendment in the first place. "The
principle and almost sole theory today is that excluding the evidence
will punish the police officers who made the illegal search and seizure
or otherwise violated the constitutional rights of the defendant, and
thus deter policemen from committing the same violation again." 13
Those advocating a contraction of the rule point out the illogic behind
such a purpose.14 Thus, it is here that the battle lines are drawn.
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS. DAWN OF THE GOOD
FAITH EXCEPTION
In 1976, Jo Anne Williams was arrested in Ohio by DEA Special
Agent Paul Markonni for possession of narcotics. She pleaded guilty
and was released on bond pending her appeal. As a condition of her
bond, she was restricted in travel to the State of Ohio.
On September 28, 1977, Special Agent Markonni was on duty at
the Atlanta International Airport. He observed Williams deplane from
a flight arriving from Los Angeles. 5
Markonni, aware of her travel restrictions, arrested her for violat-
ing those restrictions (i.e., bail jumping). Upon this arrest, Williams'
person was searched and a packet of an opiate was discovered.
Markonni subsequently obtained a warrant to search Williams' luggage
and a large quantity of heroin was discovered.
At trial, Williams made a timely motion to suppress all evidence
12. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-85 (1928) (dissenting
opinion).
13. Wilkey, supra note 10, at 220. See Justice Powell's majority opinion at 414
U.S. at 347. But see Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 338, 416 (1971).
14. Wilkey, supra note 10, at 214.
15. Agent Markonni was present at this particular location as part of the DEA's
Drug Courier Interdiction Program. Flights arriving from Los Angeles were monitored
because the city had been identified as a source of illegal drugs carried by couriers. 594
F.2d at 88 n.5.
1331
3
Dawson: Ciminal Law: Exlusionary Rule United States V. Williams
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
134 Nova Law Journal 5:1980
seized by government authorities. The magistrate denied this motion.
The circuit court disagreed and suppressed the evidence. 16 According to
the court's interpretation, Special Agent Markonni did not have the
authority to arrest Williams.17 This conclusion was reached despite the
fact that Markonni had a good faith belief that his actions were
proper.18 The court reasoned that this decision would serve as a deter-
rent to other police activity involving bail jumping.19
Because of the strong dichotomy of feelings on this issue, a major-
16. Id. at 91. The court concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1976) is violated only
for "the willful failure to appear before any court or judicial officer as required. (em-
phasis in original). The mere violation of a bond condition, other than a failure to
appear as ordered, is not a criminal offense within the meaning of section 3150." (cita-
tions omitted) (emphasis supplied).
17. Id. at 92. The court declared that 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1970) empowered
only a court to punish disobedience or contempt of its order by fine or imprisonment,
and that 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970) initiates only judicial authority and empowers a
court, not a DEA agent, to determine whether punitive action is warranted. Id. The
following relevant portions were cited by the court: 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) provides:
"A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at
its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other as ... (emphasis in origi-
nal). (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command." Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 provides:
(a) Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by
death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pend-
ing trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured
appearance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer
determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasona-
bly assure the appearance of the person as required. When such a determination
is made, the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above
methods or relief, impose the first of the following conditions of release which
will reasonably assure the appearance of the person for trial or, if no single con-
dition gives that assurance, any combination of the following conditions; ...
(2) place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the
person during the period of release . ...
(c) A judicial officer authorizing the release of a person under this section shall
issue an appropriate order containing a statement of the conditions imposed, if
any, shall inform such person of the penalties applicable to violations of the con-
ditions of his release and shall advise him that a warrant for his arrest will be
issued immediately upon any such violation.
18. 622 F.2d at 846. But see United States v. Avery, 447 F.2d 978 (4th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972), cited at 594 F.2d at 93.
19. 594 F.2d at 96 n. 18.
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ity of the judges in active service granted their own motion to rehear
the case en bane on briefs and without oral argument.
The en banc court reversed with alternative holdings. Although all
felt the arrest was valid, ten of the twenty-four judges avoided the ex-
clusionary rule question by concluding that the search and seizure were
proper,20 and went no further. However, the majority (13) felt that evi-
dence should not be suppressed "under the exclusionary rule where it is
discovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good
faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken belief, that they are au-
thorized."21 Special Agent Markonni, the court felt, had met this
standard.
In coming to this decision, the court relied on the deterrence prin-
ciple in concluding that "the exclusionary rule exists to deter willful or
flagrant actions by police, not reasonable good faith ones. Where the
reason for the rule ceases, its application must cease also."122 The court
restricted the exclusionary rule "to conform. . . to its underlying pur-
pose: to deter unreasonable or bad faith police conduct."23 This court
thus became the first to explicitly articulate a "good faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule.
TREND OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
Almost from the beginning, legal scholars were aware that the rule
had its shortcomings. Justice Cardozo criticized the rule pointing out
that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable had blundered
... A room is searched against the law, and the body of a man is
found. . . . The privacy of the home has been infringed, and the mur-
derer goes free." 2'
In practice, the rule produced a misguided result; protecting the
20. In Judge Politz's special concurring opinion, the ten judges felt that Williams
had willfully breached a court order by violating a condition of her release. Such viola-
tion, they reasoned, constituted criminal contempt of court, which is considered a
crime.
21. 622 F.2d at 840.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 847.
24. People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587-88 (1926),
cited in Wilkey, supra note 10, at 221.
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guilty rather than the innocent. This sentiment was expressed by Judge
Wilkey who stated:
[A] policy of excluding incriminating evidence can never protect an in-
nocent victim of an illegal search against whom no incriminating evi-
dence is discovered. The only persons protected by the rule are the guilty
against whom the most serious reliable evidence should be offered. It
cannot be separately argued that the innocent person is protected in the
future by excluding evidence against the criminal now. 25
In view of similar feelings that the exclusionary rule was too indis-
criminatory in effect, 26 a retreat from the rule began to develop. This
retreat also reflected the thoughts of those who felt that the deterrent
rationale was no longer a plausible reason for the continued enforce-
ment of the rule. Justice White spoke of this lack of deterrent effect:
When law enforcement personnel have acted mistakenly, but in good
faith and on reasonable grounds, and yet the evidence they have seized is
later excluded, the exclusion can have no deterrent effect. The officers, if
they do their duty, will act in a similar fashion in similar circumstances
in the future .... 2s
The position of those who support the good faith exception is
based on the belief that:
[T]he exclusionary rule excludes reliable, probative evidence from the
judicial fact-finding process, and thus hampers the determination of the
truth. Because exclusion is not a constitutional right, it can and should
be employed only where its underlying rationales are served. In cases
involving good faith violations, neither deterrence nor the imperative of
judicial integrity is positively affected by exclusion. Therefore, a good
faith exception should apply to all cases involving good faith mistakes or
technical violations. 29
25. Wilkey, supra note 10, at 223 (emphasis in original).
26. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
27. Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L.
REv. 736, 740 (1972).
28. 428 US. at 540 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
29. Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonableness" Ex-
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In light of this criticism of the exclusionary rule, the United States
Supreme Court began to respond. However, strong dissents indicated
how widely the court was divided on this issue.30 This led to a situation
where, in the view of the rule's opponents, progress was very slow.
The first step was the recognition that the exclusionary rule was
not a requirement of the Constitution, but rather "a judge-made rule
drafted to enforce constitutional requirements."3 1 This vital realization
which is sometimes overlooked caused one writer to respond that:
The mystique and misunderstanding of the rule causes not only many
citizens but also judges and lawyers to feel (not think) that the exclu-
sionary rule was enshrined in the Constitution by the Founding Fathers,
and that to abolish it would do violence to the whole sacred Bill of
Rights. They appear totally unaware that the rule was not employed in
the U.S. during the first 125 years of the Fourth Amendment, that it was
devised by the judiciary in the assumed absence of any other method of
controlling the police, and that no other country in the civilized world
has adopted such a rule.3"
The next step in the slow process of inhibiting the application of
the rule occurred in 1971 when Chief Justice Burger wrote in a dissent-
ing opinion that inadvertent or honest mistakes by the police should not
be treated the same as "deliberate or flagrant" violations of the fourth
amendment.33
Several similar dissents followed in which flagrantly abusive viola-
tions were distinguished from technical and good faith violations."
During this period, the Supreme Court was limiting the extent of the
exclusionary rule.3 5 These cases afforded the Fifth Circuit some
ception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 635, 654 (1978).
30. See notes 33 and 34 infra.
31. 622 F.2d at 841. E.g., 428 U.S. at 482; 414 U.S. at 348.
32. Wilkey, supra note 10, at 217 (footnote omitted). See 367 U.S. at 661-62
(Black, J., concurring); 428 U.S. at 482 (1976). Cf., 414 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
33. 403 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
34. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in
part), 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting). See also A MODEL PENAL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § SS 290.2 (Official Draft, 1975), which states that
the evidence shall be excluded only if the violation is substantial.
35. In 441 U.S. 338 (1974), the Court held that a witness summoned to appear
5:1980 137 1-Exclusionary Rule
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analagous support. Acknowledging these criticisms, as well as the in-
creasingly strong Supreme Court support, the court explicitly recog-
nized the "good faith" exception as the law in their jurisdiction.
PARAMETERS OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
In handing down this exception, the court recognized that there
are two types of "good faith" exceptions, technical violations and good
faith mistakes, both of which occurred in this case.
A technical violation of the fourth amendment occurs where an
officer acts in reliance upon a statute which is later declared unconsti-
tutional, a warrant which is reflected as insufficient, or an interpreta-
tion of the law which is subsequently overruled.36 The officer's belief
must be both bona fide and reasonable.3 7 Since arrests made in good
faith reliance on a statute not yet declared unconstitutional are consid-
ered valid in the Fifth Circuit,3 8 evidence of other crimes obtained as a
result of searches and seizures made incidental to those arrests is ad-
missable.39 Thus, even though title 18, section 3146 of the United
States code was reconstrued by the panel, the court, en banc, felt that
the officer's reliance was in reasonable good faith and that the evidence
should not be excluded.40 He had acted under a reasonable belief "and
and testify before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that
they are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. Similarly, in
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), the Court admitted evidence obtained as a
result of statements taken in complete good faith but without the proper Miranda
rights. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), held that the exclusionary rule
should not exclude evidence in the civil proceeding of one sovereign which was illegally
seized by a criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign. Michigan v. DeFil-
lippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), held arrests made in "good faith" reliance that an ordinance
is constitutional will not be invalidated if the ordinance is later declared unconstitu-
tional. Cf. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1980), wherein the Court excluded evidence
as a violation of the fourth amendment because there was no probable cause.
36. Ball, supra note 29, at 641 n.69.
37. See, e.g., 443 U.S. at 38 (1979). See also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
531 (1975); United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 848 (1976).
38. Hamrick v. Wainwright, 465 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Kil-
gen, 445 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1971).
39. 465 F.2d 940; 445 F.2d 287.
40. 622 F.2d at 846.
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should not be charged with knowledge that a future panel decision
would construe § 3146 to apply only to bond jumping that involved
missing a court appearance."41
A good faith mistake occurs from an officer's reasonable but mis-
taken judgment as to probable cause. In Williams, the court held that
Special Agent Markonni acted under a reasonable, though mistaken,
belief as to the probable cause under which he arrested Williams, be-
cause he made a "reasonable factual error about an element of the
crime.' ', 2 The court acknowledged that his good faith and reasonable-
ness were not questioned here.
However, the underlying mandate of the Williams decision is
clear. Henceforth, in the Fifth Circuit:
[W]hen evidence is sought to be excluded because of police conduct
leading to its discovery, it will be open to the proponent of the evidence
to urge that the conduct in question, if mistaken or unauthorized, was
yet taken in a reasonable good faith belief that it was proper. If the
court so finds, it shall not apply the exclusionary rule to the evidence
... .We therefore. .. [go] no further than to delineate the "excep-
tion" itself explicitly and to recognize that where the proponent estab-
lishes it, [reasonable good faith] the evidence should be received if other-
wise admissible.4 3
But the court emphasized that this exception will not reward defi-
cient understandings of the law. On the contrary, the court held that
the arresting officer's belief:
[I]n addition to being held in subjective good faith, must be grounded in
an objective reasonableness. It must therefore be based upon articulate
premises sufficient to cause a reasonable, and reasonably trained officer
to believe that he was acting lawfully. Thus, a series of broadcast
breakins and searches carried out by a constable - no matter how pure
in heart - who had never heard of the fourth amendment could never
qualify. 4
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 841 n.4a.
1391Exclusionary Rule
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The Williams court was attempting to draw a fine line in deciding
when evidence should be excluded. Keeping the rule's deterrent inten-
tions in mind, the court is seeking to reward the efforts of officers who
have acted in reasonable good faith, while punishing the ignorance of
officers whose good faith fails to measure up to the objective standards
for the profession. The court thus puts a premium on a quality educa-
tion for field officers so that they will rigidly adhere to the fourth
amendment's confines. On those occasions when a mistake occurs, the
fruits of arrests based upon reasonable good-faith reliance as to proba-
ble cause will not be excluded. In this manner, the court can both deter
bad policework and admit evidence which was obtained legally.
CONCLUSION
In coming to this decision, the court has taken a bold stand on a
controversial issue. Because of the disparity of views concerning
whether to limit the extent of the rule, this issue will come up again.
Four current members of. the Supreme Court are in favor of the limita-
tion espoused in this case.45 Whether this doctrine becomes the law of
the land remains to be seen.
This dichotomy was illustrated in the manner in which the court
arrived at the decision. Because all agreed that the original arrest was
valid, ten of the twenty-four felt that the good-faith exception need not
have been addressed.4' This diversity could immunize this case from
Supreme Court review.4v
Although this doctrine is now the law in this circuit, and in view of
the Fifth Circuit splitting, its precedential value will be problematical
until the Supreme Court rules affirmatively on this issue.
Joseph R. Dawson
45. See notes 33-35, supra. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, White, and
Rehnquist have gone on record in support of the good-faith exception.
46. 622 F.2d 848 (Rubin, J., specially concurring).
47. Id. at 851.
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